

Advances In Software Technology Since 1992*

and a modest proposal for dealing with them...

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About The Title

- **Why “Advances In Software Technology”?**
Because
 - There have been many
 - These advances are important to aerospace
- **Why 1992?** Because:
 - That was when DO-178B was published, ***16 years ago***
 - Standard reflects the technology of 20 years ago

About The Title

- **Why now?** Because:
 - Software engineering landscape continues to change
 - A lot of effort is being expended on DO-178C
- Term “software engineering” was coined in 1968

40 years ago

DO-178B around roughly *half that time*


Remember, these are *strictly* my views

About Me *Please Forgive My Saying This*

- Why qualifies me to speak about this?
- Professor of Computer Science at the University of Virginia
 - Teaching & research on software engr. for safety critical systems
- Editor in Chief, IEEE Transactions on Sw. Engr, 2002-2005
- General chair of:
 - 2000 International Symposium on Foundations of Sw Engr (FSE)
 - 2007 International Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE)
- IEEE CS Harlan Mills Award, 2006
- ACM SIGSOFT Distinguished Service Award, 2008

Software Technology

What Affects Software Technology?



Going to look at a few sample topics

Please Note...

Talking about technology that has been
developed

NOT

Technology that has necessarily been
widely *adopted*

What Is The Major Challenge?

□ 1992:

Implementation defects dominated

□ 2008:

Requirements defects dominate

--- This is a *huge* difference ---

Why Has This Occurred?

Better implementation techniques

Larger and more complex applications

Don't worry, the gene pool has not changed.

Implementation Technologies


Implementation Technologies

- ❑ Practical formal specification languages, tools & techniques
- ❑ Effective software reuse
- ❑ Model-based development
- ❑ Better high-level languages
- ❑ Practical formal verification
- ❑ Model checking
- ❑ Powerful static analysis
- ❑ Better inspections and reviews
- ❑ Better software assessment techniques
- ❑ Managed development processes
- ❑ High quality COTS components

Formal Specification


- 1992:
 - Few formal languages, mostly laboratory curiosities
 - Natural language dominated
- 2008:
 - Many formal languages
 - Z, VDM, RSML, Statecharts, PVS
 - And some narrow-domain, semi-formal languages:
 - SCADE, Simulink
 - Permit analysis and much better communication
 - Demonstrated value
 - Substantial tool support
- Many reasons to use them, ***especially in safety-critical systems***

Formal Specification



Establish useful properties of the specification

Refinement



Software Reuse

- Three approaches to reuse:
 - Very high level languages
 - Application generators
 - Component libraries and canonical designs
- 1987:
 - Software Productivity Consortium
 - Reuse was viewed as a panacea
 - Still an embryonic technology in 1992
- 2008:
 - Mature technology
 - Reuse is being applied to all software artifacts
 - Important technology for cost control and quality improvement

Programming

- 1992:
 - Ad hoc, procedural languages
 - FORTRAN, C, Pascal
 - Ada '83

- 2008:
 - Pascal derivatives:
 - Modula
 - SPARK Ada
 - Ada 2007

- How different are they?

Designed For
Scientific

Designed For

Designed For
Teaching

Pro
Li

Designed For
Embedded, Real-
time, Safety-Critical
Systems

- C#
- Java

Benefits Of Types & Static Analysis

Software
in C

Software
in Ada

Software
in SPARK Ada

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

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Defects That Escape Development



Model Checking

- 1992:
 - Only just invented
- 2008:
 - In common use



Model Checking

- A model is:
 - A program in a modeling language
 - Describes some of the computation, typically:
 - Concurrency
 - Synchronization
 - Communication
 - A “model” of the concurrent part of the program
- Desired temporal conditions are checked, e.g.:
 - This never happens
 - This happens at some point
- Allows things like deadlock to be specified
- Defined in a temporal logic

Implementation Technologies

- Practical formal specification languages
- Effective software reuse
- Model-based development
- Better high-level languages
- Practical formal verification
- Model checking
- Powerful static analysis
- Better inspections and reviews
- Better software assessment techniques
- Managed development processes
- High quality COTS components

Requirements Technologies

Community Response

- International Conf. on Requirements Engineering:
 - Started 1993
- Requirements Engineering Journal (Springer):
 - Started 1996
- Numerous web sites started:
 - See <http://www.systemsguild.com/GuildSite/Guild/resources.html>
- Many tools created
 - See <http://www.volere.co.uk/tools.htm>
- Many important techniques developed:
 - E.g., Use cases

Formal Specification

- As noted earlier:
 - 1992: laboratory curiosity (except for CICS)
 - 2008: practical technology, fully supported
- What change has this brought?
- Analysis:
 - Syntax—we are all talking the same language
 - Types—we don't mix apples and oranges
 - Properties—things like:
 - Input coverage completeness
 - Freedom from transitions to undesired states
- Vastly better communication and understanding

Rapid Prototyping

- Major practical advances since 1992
- Attacks uncertainty in requirements
- A prototype can be used to answer a wide range of questions, e.g.:
 - Important aspects of functionality
 - Determination of performance adequacy
 - Whether systems are acceptable to users
- Incomplete or defective requirements are not an excuse
- You can't build if you don't know what to build

Executable Specifications

- Literally formal specifications that can be executed
- 1992:
 - Embryonic technology
 - Laboratory curiosity
- 2008:
 - Serious capabilities with serious tools
 - Examples in narrow domains:
 - SCADA, Simulink
 - Examples in broad domains:
 - NRL's SCR system
 - Statecharts and Statemate

Computer System Architecture

Distributed Systems

- 1992:
 - A few specialized systems
 - 1553 bus dominated
- 2008:
 - Local and wide-area networks, including real-time buses
 - Multiple advantages from both
 - Many technical issues solved

But

- Some solutions absolutely ***require*** proof, e.g.:
 - Distributed agreement
 - Clock synchronization


Software Architecture

- 1992:
 - Term had not been coined
- 2008:
 - Major field of practice and study
 - Powerful concepts and associated results
 - Standard patterns with important properties
 - Middleware
 - Objects at the system level:
 - .Net
 - Corba
 - Etc.

Hardware Technology

Integration Levels

- 1992:
 - Intel 80486
 - 1.2M transistors
 - 50 MHz clock
- 2008:
 - Intel Core 2 Extreme QX6700
 - 582M transistors
 - 2,930 MHz clock
- DRAM/SRAM memories ~100 times larger
- Non-volatile CF memory Not available in 1992
- Entire range of data communications equipment



Microprocessor Architecture

- ❑ Very large address spaces
- ❑ Sophisticated virtual memory structures
- ❑ On-chip large caches
- ❑ Out-of-order execution
- ❑ Sophisticated pipelines
- ❑ Multi-threaded hardware
- ❑ Multiple cores



And

- ❑ Variety of architectures and instruction sets

Hardware Dependability

- Fundamental characteristics of hardware failure have changed

- 1992:

Degradation faults dominated

- 2008:

Design faults dominate

SEUs significant

Byzantine faults significant

Impact Of Hardware On Software

- **Much** more software:
 - Many more critical applications possible
 - Introduction of non-critical applications
 - Advent of data-intensive applications
- Vastly more **complex** software:
 - Distributed systems
 - Highly concurrent systems
- Software support for hardware:
 - Management of resources
 - Dealing with hardware faults
 - Unpredictable hardware performance, esp. timing

And Finally...

Security

- 1992:
 - Security? What's that?
- 2008:
 - Security:
 - Authentication, tamper-proofing
 - Confidentiality, integrity
 - Important for airborne and ground systems
 - Going to get a lot worse:
 - Data links from everywhere to everywhere
 - Mobile devices
- Security is not an “add on”, it **has** to be built in

Oh No, One More Thing...


Unmanned Air Systems



An unmanned aircraft is ***not*** just a manned aircraft without a pilot.

A Modest Proposal

Enhancing DO-178B?



Challenges


- ❑ Wide variety of systems:
 - Commercial transports
 - Unmanned air systems
 - Ground systems
- ❑ Wide variety of technologies
- ❑ Wide variety of assurance requirements
- ❑ Backward compatibility with DO-178B
- ❑ Switch in basic certification approach to rigorous argument
- ❑ Addressing the NRC report:
 - “*Software for Dependable Systems: Sufficient Evidence?*”

This Is A Very Hard Problem

- ❑ Can an enhanced standard deal with these challenges?
- ❑ Some, but not all
- ❑ Cannot get a quart into a pint pot
- ❑ Any comprehensive solution faces the prospect of evolving into a “Swiss Army Knife”
- ❑ **Trying to do so, puts tremendous pressure on DO-178C**
- ❑ So, I propose DO-1743

***I have a bottle of wine for the first person
to figure out why it's 1743 without a hint***

DO-1743



Advantages Of DO-1743

- ❑ Can accommodate all advances in software technology
- ❑ **Includes DO-178B yet compliance will be for DO-1743**
- ❑ Provision for inclusion of DO-178C once it is complete
- ❑ **Removes pressure from DO-178C to be comprehensive**
- ❑ Provides a mechanism for FAA to require certain combinations of technology for certain purposes
- ❑ Applicant can choose technology and processes suitable for the system the applicant is building

Advantages Of DO-1743

- ❑ Incorporates the modern notion of safety cases
- ❑ **Addresses the issues raised in NRC Committee Report**
- ❑ Can be applied to ground systems immediately and without modification
- ❑ Can be applied to unmanned air systems immediately and without modification
- ❑ Alignment with:
 - British MoD Defence Standard 00-56
 - U.S. FDA planned replacement for 510K

Conclusion

- The software world has changed dramatically
- Arguably:
 - The challenges cannot be met **fully** by an enhanced DO-178B
 - Many can be, so DO-178C will provide a lot of value
 - Comprehensive approach requires a new paradigm
- New paradigm is carefully managed safety-case structure
- DO-1743 is a start at the necessary framework

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